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The 2011 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement: Intentions vs. Incentives

The summer before the 2011 NFL season, the NFL engaged in one of the most
bitter labor negotiations in its recent history. Players, owners, and league officials fought
tooth and nail to make their priorities NFL law through their inclusion in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. News coverage swirled over the reactions of players to the
potential of a lost season, questions over what was changing in the agreement, and
primarily, why the negotiations were taking so long. Soon, conversation turned to
whether there would be a need for replacement players, as was the case in 1987, or for a
shortened season, as was the case in 1982.
This thesis will examine the 2011 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
with the benefit of hindsight, analyzing the key features of the 2011 CBA, their intended
consequences, and their actual impact on the league and its players. It will also serve to
forecast if/how these issues might come into play in the 2021 CBA for relevant issues.
The issues of primary concern for the 2011 CBA were the distribution of league revenues
between the players and the owners, the distribution of team spending on rookies versus
veterans, player safety, and commissioner powers. In this negotiation, veteran players
sought to augment their revenue streams by addressing the first two issues, and protect
themselves through the second two. Unfortunately, the impacts of the policies that
players implemented had, by in large, the opposite of the anticipated effect, harming the
players at almost every turn. By creating a rookie pay scale and increasing veteran
minimums, veterans may have made themselves more easily substitutable for rookies,
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and by limiting the amount of practice time in the offseason, players may have increased
the prevalence of conditioning related injuries.
After providing some context on the 2011 CBA, I will take a deeper look at the
key takeaways. The context section will provide the reader with an understanding of how
collective bargaining has taken place during previous agreements, and the general
bargaining process, as well as what the intentions of CBAs generally are. Furthermore,
this section will provide the reader with the background knowledge required to
understand the issues of the salary cap, rookie pay scale and veteran minimums, player
safety concerns, and the relationship between the players and the league. This will help
clarify some of the more complicated issues in the body of the paper, in addition to
allowing the reader to focus on the analysis and the current issues facing NFL players as
a result of the 2011 agreement.
In order to do this, the body of the paper will analyze how the NFLPA used
changes in the salary cap and salary minimums as a bargaining chip, the tradeoffs that
occurred in the establishment of the current rookie wage scale and veteran minimum
systems, the impact of practice time on the prevalence of player injuries since the signing
of the current CBA, and how Commissioner Roger Goodell’s use of disciplinary powers
has impacted current players’ perceptions of the league. Ultimately, it is clear that the
NFLPA failed its constituents in many of the key negotiating areas in the CBA. Within
the benefit of reflection, it would appear as though the upcoming 2021 negotiations will
be accompanied by a holdout, which could even stretch into the NFL regular season.
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Section I - Background:
A) CBAs Generally and the Bargaining Process:
Before diving into background on the 2011 CBA, context on previous NFL
Collective Bargaining Agreements is crucial. In the NFL, the Collective Bargaining
Agreement is the terms to which the NFL Players Association (NFLPA) and the owners
of the 32 NFL teams agree to run the league under for a set period of time. This includes
items ranging from the payment of rookies and the total salary cap for each season to the
disciplinary power held by the commissioner and the NFL’s drug policy for performance
enhancing drugs (PEDs) and marijuana, and everything between. Thus, during
negotiations, both sides are very defensive of the gains that they have made and
aggressive in trying to bargain for things that they feel that they deserve. The CBA in
football is often viewed as unique because of the violent nature of the sport that leaves
former players especially vulnerable once their primary revenue stream has dried up and
they begin experiencing the negative physical and mental effects of their time spent in the
NFL. Thus, considerations for retirees and veteran players are often highly deliberated
and were one of the focuses of the 2011 CBA.
The NFLPA has used CBAs throughout the majority of the Super Bowl Era to
bargain for higher wages and as a mechanism to collectively strike. The Super Bowl Era
describes the modern NFL, which combined with the rival league the AFL (American
Football League) and began awarding the Super Bowl Trophy rather than the NFL
Championship Trophy. The first CBA was struck in 1968, before the third season of the
Super Bowl Era, when players tried to pressure the owners into providing better
compensation and benefits. This led to the first NFL lockout.
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A lockout is when owners do not allow players to participate in team activities,
and is the mechanism that NFL owners use to make players follow their direction. A
similar term, holdout, is essentially a lockout run by the players, where players do not
report to mandatory NFL training until there is a satisfactory agreement reached. In the
case of a lockout, owners do not pay their players because they are not allowed in the
facility, while in a holdout the players do not report to team activities and therefore they
chose to forgo their wage in order to negotiate for better compensation. This first lockout
lasted only 11 days before the owners and players agreed to terms.1 This is generally the
same process that other CBA negotiations gone south have followed, with varying
lengths of lockouts/holdouts stretching from a few days to multiple months. These can be
ended amicably through good faith negotiations and bargaining, or more aggressively
through litigation and strikes that sometimes impact the season.
The negotiation process for CBAs is often complicated, confusing, and fairly
counterintuitive to the players, let alone for an outside observer. Thus, this paper will
provide a general overview of the bargaining process, providing the steps that took place
in the 2011 negotiations, some of which will likely also occur during the 2021
negotiations. One wrinkle particular to the 2011 CBA was the opt-out by the owners from
the 2006 CBA. This will be discussed further in the next section, but was a key part of the
2011 CBA negotiation process that could not be left out. The 2011 CBA did not include
an opt-out clause, which would allow one or both sides to back out of the agreement after

1

Michael Schottey, "How Free Agency Changed the NFL Forever," Bleacher Report,
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1561856-how-free-agency-changed-the-nfl-forever.
2
Adam Stites, "NFLPA Is Warning Players to Start Saving Money Now for a 2021
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a certain amount of time, for the NFL owners nor the NFL Players Association after the
controversy that arose from its use to end the 2006 CBA.
In 2011, the CBA negotiation process began with federal mediation.2 This is fairly
typical of negotiations around the CBA as well as for other negotiations between the
players and the league since both want the input of a neutral arbiter. Despite mediation,
little progress resulted, leading to a weeklong extension of the 2006 CBA and the
continuation of negotiations between the NFL and NFLPA for a new CBA3. After a few
weeks of bargaining, once it was clear that the distance between the sides was
insurmountable, the NFLPA decertified as a union in order to file an anti-trust lawsuit.4
This is a common and intuitive practice for sports unions given anti-trust law and the
monopoly power that a sports league has over the livelihood of its players. It also gave
the players the legal clout that they were previously lacking as a certified union.
Historically, NFL owners have had significantly more power than individual
players, and typically more influence than even a large number of players. The creation
of a CBA was meant to solve this, but during the time between when the owners opted
out of the 2006 CBA and a new one was implemented, the players were in very
precarious position. Decertifying as a union gave the players the right to litigate
separately against the NFL, thus providing much more support for the case. After a series
of back and forth appeals, the granting of both temporary and permanent stays to lift the
lockout (which were reversed and re-reversed), and a variety of other legal issues, the

2

Adam Stites, "NFLPA Is Warning Players to Start Saving Money Now for a 2021
Lockout," https://www.sbnation.com/2017/5/30/15712404/nflpa-cba-nfl-lockout-2021leverage-negotiations.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.

6
NFL and players continued to negotiate, mostly behind closed doors, in order to move
closer toward a new CBA.5 After frantic discussions between the NFL and the NFLPA in
order to avoid impacting the regular season, the new CBA was voted on and agreed to by
the players and owners on July 25th, 2011.
This brief account should give context as to some complications that can arise in
CBA negotiations in general, as well as what specifically occurred during the 2011 CBA
negotiations. Since players were unaware that there would be a lockout because owners
opted out of the 2006 CBA prematurely, they were unable to appropriately plan
financially. This put the owners in the driver’s seat of the negotiations, since the skill of
an NFL player is very difficult to translate to outside of football, whereas the owners
have outside revenue streams and thus were not cripplingly financially impacted by the
holdout. The 2011 CBA negotiation is known as one of the most hard fought and
complex negotiations to occur in NFL CBA history. There were a variety of
complications that were unique to the 2011 CBA negotiation given the context of the
league and society as a whole at the time, just as there likely will be for the 2021 CBA
negotiation. In order to fully understand the context of the 2011 CBA, it is crucial to
understand the circumstances that led to the negotiations. The next section will provide
some context first in regards to the 2006 CBA, and later with respect to some cultural
issues that were prevalent at the time that influenced the 2011 CBA.

B) Ghosts of CBAs Past and NFL Free Agency:

5

Ibid.
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The 2006 CBA is one of the shortest lived in NFL history and kicked off the 2011
CBA negotiations that ultimately ended up being one of the longest negotiating processes
in NFL history. CBAs tend to have a fixed length (the length of the 2011 CBA is 10
years) but, as in the case of the 2006 CBA, they sometimes include an opt-out clause for
one or both sides of the agreement. In 2006 there was an opt-out for both sides, which the
NFL owners utilized in 2008.6 For the 2011 CBA there was a two-way opt-out clause
discussed, but it was ultimately scrapped in favor of a uniform, 10-year CBA length.7 The
2006 CBA was actually an extension of the CBA that was initially agreed to in 1993.8
This CBA had been extended to 2006 through a multitude of other small extensions
similar to the 2006 CBA. With each extension there were minor adjustments, but the
main substance of the CBA remained consistent.
The 1993 CBA kicked off what has since been deemed the “Free Agency era”.
This is because it allowed players whose contract had expired to explore their options
with every team in the league by fielding contract offers from any team. This process is
known as unrestricted free agency, giving the players the freedom to decide on what team
they want to go to based on whatever criteria they decide. This was staunchly different
from the system prior to the 1993 CBA, which had free agency, but it was severely

6

Ben Volin, "NFL Owners Destroyed the Players in CBA Negotiations,"
https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2013/07/20/nfl-owners-destroyed-players-cbanegotiations/ia3c1ydpS16H5FhFEiviHP/story.html.
7
Gregg Rosenthal, "Final Answer: No Opt Out Clause in CBA,"
https://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/07/25/final-answer-no-opt-out-clause-in-cba/.
8

"NFL Labor History Since 1968,"
http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?page=nfl_labor_history.
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restricted. The earlier system gave teams the right to “protect 37 percent of their
players… with the right of first refusal”, which was known as restricted free agency.9
Unrestricted free agency fundamentally changed the sport and the philosophy of
team building. It allowed General Mangers (the person generally tasked with adding and
jettisoning players) more freedom to make up for bad drafting by adding proven veteran
talent. It also places a finite timeline on teams and players attempting to negotiate a deal,
since they can also negotiate with other teams. Additionally, unrestricted free agency
places a higher value on drafting every year, creating a system where teams are only
guaranteed to have the players that they drafted for the duration of their first contract.
While that can be helpful for a team in the case of a draft pick that does not work out, it
can be potentially disastrous for teams that have many young players that are looking for
second contracts while the team does not have the financial flexibility to retain them all.
While free agency was a bit of a mixed bag from the perspective of NFL teams
and owners, it was a distinct win for the NFLPA and the players. Free agency gives
players the opportunity to leave a team once their contract is up without having to worry
about their former team controlling their negotiating rights. It also allows players to test
their value on the open market and take the best deal for them. Instead of only knowing
the value that the team who drafted them places on the player, free agency allows players
to negotiate with any team in the NFL and maximize their earnings potential. While
positional needs and salary cap restrictions reduce this from thirty-two teams, it still gives
players a much larger market for their services than they had previously enjoyed. This
allows players more freedom in the location where they play, coaches that they play for,

9

Schottey, "How Free Agency Changed the NFL Forever."
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schemes that they want to play in, etc. Free agency is especially closely tied with the
salary cap. In tandem with the establishment of free agency in 1993, the NFL also
introduced the salary cap, which essentially served as the owners guarantee that free
agency would not create an uncapped bidding war between teams.
The NFL, in contrast to some other sports leagues around the world, utilizes a
salary cap on its teams to ensure parity between teams. One of the calling cards of the
NFL is the mantra “any given Sunday”, implying that any team could beat any other team
in any given game, or on “any given Sunday” since games are traditionally played on
Sundays. The salary cap is a key aspect of this because it provides a limit to the amount
that any team can spend on its players in a year. The negotiations on the level of the
salary cap are incredibly complex and require intimate knowledge of the NFL’s revenue
streams such as TV deals and merchandise sales. In the 2006 CBA negotiations, the NFL
and NFLPA agreed on about a sixty-forty revenue split, exempting some revenue streams
from the equation all together to appease the wishes of owners concerned with their
bottom line. The revenue of the NFL just over ten years ago was dramatically smaller
than it is today given the ability of the current Commissioner of the NFL, Roger Goodell
to maximize league profits. At the time of the 2006 CBA negotiation, however, the
revenues were much smaller, so the sixty percent figure that was allocated to players was
nowhere near the level that it is today at a smaller percentage ($102 million in 2006
versus $177 million today).10 The CBA gives guidelines for teams about how much of the
salary cap they have to spend (to incentivize teams not to collude and drive player

10

"NFL Communications - Year-by-Year Salary Cap," NFL,
https://nfllabor.wordpress.com/2010/02/24/year-by-year-salary-cap/.
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salaries down), the amount of the unspent cap that is carried over year-to-year, and other
more intricate details.
The primary issue for owners in the 2006 CBA negotiation was revenue sharing
between owners of big market teams, like the Dallas Cowboys, and small market teams,
like the Cincinnati Bengals. The infighting that resulted allowed the players to seize the
opportunity to maximize their revenue allocation, which is how they were able to secure
sixty percent of league revenues. However, once the 2006 CBA had been implemented
and the owners had accepted the new revenue sharing model among themselves, they
decided to use the opt-out clause. This was partially in order to reduce the percentage of
revenues shared with players, especially because of the large new TV contracts that they
knew were to be negotiated in the coming years. Thus, one of the key issues for the
owners in the 2011 CBA negotiations was revenue sharing between the players and the
owners, which will be explored in more depth later in the analysis section of the paper.
In 2010, due to the use of the opt-out clause by the owners and the inability for
the owners and NFLPA to reach an agreement on a new CBA, the league experienced its
first “uncapped” year since the implementation of the salary cap in 1993.11 Thus, teams
were free to spend as much or as little as they desired. While most teams chose to
generally follow the salary cap progression from prior years, two teams participated fully
in the spirit of the uncapped year, spending money and frontloading contracts in order to
take advantage of the temporary removal of the salary cap. The league penalized both
teams, the Dallas Cowboys and the Washington Redskins, in 2012 and 2013 with a
reduction in their salary cap because it deemed that they had inappropriately frontloaded
11

John Perritano, "How Does the NFL Salary Cap Work?," HowStuffWorks,
https://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/question644.htm.
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contracts in 2010, which ultimately disrupted the competitive balance of the league.12
There have been allegations of collusion by the owners to drive player salaries down
during 2010 in order to keep the payroll of every team regulated, but this has not been
proven. The uncapped year is not directly relevant to the 2011 CBA, but does serve to
provide some league context for the negotiations and the gulf between the players and
owners. Furthermore, understanding the uncapped year provides a greater familiarity with
the benefits of the salary cap for owners and how it regulates league parity.
The two most recent CBAs serve to provide a significant amount of league
context for the 2011 CBA negotiations. While many earlier negotiations had been
smoother between the NFL and the NFLPA, when Goodell became Commissioner in
September of 2006, tensions between the NFL and the players rose as he exerted more of
his influence on the league. Once the 2011 negotiations arrived, the two sides were so far
apart that a lockout seemed almost inevitable. However, because this type of hostility had
not occurred in recent CBA negotiations, players were financially unprepared.

C) The Policies that Broke the Players’ Trust and the State of Player Preparation
After being selected as the incoming Commissioner of the NFL just before the
2006 season, Roger Goodell inherited an NFL with many areas for improvement, from
league discipline to player safety. One place that he took especially seriously was in how
players conducted themselves off the field. This emphasis lead to the release of a
Personal Conduct Policy in 2007 that held players more strongly accountable for their
12

Judy Battista, "NFL Strips Cowboys and Redskins of Salary Cap Room," The New
York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/sports/football/nfl-strips-cowboysand-redskins-of-salary-cap-room.html.
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actions and recognized the role that NFL players hold in our national culture.13 Goodell’s
policy was in response to multiple players being arrested repeatedly during the offseason,
committing crimes often with limited legal repercussions. A phrase at the beginning of
the policy soon became emblematic of its goal: “As an employee of the NFL or a member
club, you are held to a higher standard and expected to conduct yourself in a way that is
responsible, promotes the values upon which the league is based, and is lawful”.14 This
means that players could be reprimanded by the league for personal conduct violations
regardless of how their actions were viewed by the justice system.
The policy immediately went into effect on a few players, leading to the
imposition of a season long suspension for Adam “Pacman” Jones and a half season
suspension each for Chris Henry and Terry “Tank” Johnson. Jones was accused of battery
and felony coercion, Henry was accused of aggravated assault with a firearm, and
Johnson was accused of unlawful possession of a firearm.1516
While the policy was initially popular with the NFL Player’s Association,
garnering words of support from the NFLPA President at the time Gene Upshaw, it
quickly soured in the view of the players as Goodell began exerting his influence beyond
where the players felt appropriate.17 Not only were these suspensions more plentiful than

13

Brent Jones, "Goodell Strengthens NFL Personal Conduct Policy," USA Today,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2007-04-10-new-conductpolicy_N.htm?csp=34.
14
Mark Alesia, "NFL Personal Conduct Policy,"
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1102477-nfl-personal-conduct-policy.html.
15
Jarrett Bell, “Conduct Unbecoming: NFL Sets New Standard With Suspensions,”
USA Today, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2007-04-10-pacmanhenry-suspensions_N.htm.
16
Len Pasquarelli, "Bears Decide to Move On, Waive Tank Johnson," ESPN,
http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=2916083.
17
Jones, "Goodell Strengthens NFL Personal Conduct Policy."
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in previous years, Goodell seemed to kick-start an era of increasing accountability in the
NFL as high profile players were brought into the national spotlight and significantly
reprimanded.
In order to incentivize teams to buy into the disciplinary process, Goodell also
sought to hold teams accountable for the actions of their players.18 The policy applied to
players and coaches, as well as other team employees, owners, and officials, providing a
standard set of behavioral norms for everyone involved in the NFL, but applying these
conditions to many that had not had their conduct regulated by the NFL before.19 This
laid the groundwork for a relationship between Goodell and the owners that has had
many peaks and valleys throughout his tenure. The fact that the Personal Conduct Policy
applied to everyone involved in the NFL was notable because of how the policy was
employed. Action through the policy was not a result of a conviction through the justice
department. This was a deviation from the past that caused much consternation in the
case of “Pacman” Jones, who was the first player to be penalized by this new system to
its fullest extent. He received a season-long suspension despite the fact that he was not
convicted of a crime by a court of law. Initially supported for the stand that the policy
represented with respect to player accountability, players and fans soon became confused
by the new standard of proof required for investigation and penalization by the NFL.
Over time players became more and more frustrated with the Personal Conduct
Policy, primarily because of its arbitrariness. This encompassed not only confusion with
the standard of proof, but also the process by which they were investigated. Under the
18

Barry Wilner, "Goodell Strengthens NFL Conduct Policy," The Washington Post,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/04/10/AR2007041001050.html.
19
Alesia, "NFL Personal Conduct Policy."
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Personal Conduct Policy, the league conducted its own investigations, called witnesses,
and determined its own punishments completely independent from the law of the land.
However, players took significant issue with a specific line in the policy, “Upon
conclusion of the investigation, the Commissioner will have full authority to impose
discipline as warranted”.20 While originally unnoticed, this clause gave Goodell power
that surpassed any of his predecessors and allowed him to have the final say over all
personal conduct policy issues for players, coaches, and owners.
As mentioned above, this policy immediately led to some of the most prominent
names in the sport being held under the microscope. In addition to those listed above, this
included one of the most exciting quarterbacks of the last quarter-century Michael Vick,
and two-time Super Bowl champion quarterback Ben Roethlisberger. However, arguably
the most prominent punishment Goodell handed out in his early years was the
punishment to the New England Patriots for what has been termed “Spygate”. This was
an incident in which the New England Patriots were accused of taping the practices of the
New York Jets before their game in September of 2007 and stealing their sideline signals.
Following an internal investigation by the NFL, the Patriots were forced to forfeit their
first round draft pick, pay a fine of $250,000, and the head coach was also fined the
maximum amount of $500,000.21 This was especially significant because it was enforced
against the Patriots, with whom Goodell was thought to have had a particular strong
relationship, specifically with the owner Robert Kraft. Furthermore, the Patriots were led

20

Ibid.
"NFL Fines Belichick, Strips Patriots of Draft Pick," NFL.com History,
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d80251b7e/article/nfl-fines-belichick-stripspatriots-of-draft-pick.
21
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by one of the greatest quarterbacks and coaches in the NFL, in the midst of a dynasty
never before seen in the modern NFL. This was not the last time that Goodell would butt
heads with Belichick and the Patriots.
Goodell clearly amassed a significant amount of ill will during his first few years
as Commissioner, leading to very tense conversations surrounding the CBA as
negotiations grew nearer. Not only did Goodell alienate some players through his
enforcement of the Personal Conduct Policy, but he also confronted coaches and owners
that had previously seemed untouchable. Given the tension between Goodell and the
players, there was clearly the potential for players to hold out of the season, but
unfortunately they did not successfully prepare financially. Many highly paid players in
the league were forced to take high interest loans as a result of their loss in compensation
from the holdout.22 Because the players had not successfully saved and had a certain
lifestyle expectation, some were taken advantage of by these high interest loans that led
to huge issues when their playing careers were over. In an attempt to avoid this, the
NFLPA took out a $44 million insurance policy before negotiations began, which comes
to roughly $200,000 per player for the year. 23 However even this was not enough for
some players to meet their financial obligations and continue to live their preferred
lifestyle.24
While not a very complicated issue, the potential for players to miss game checks
that would set them further back financially set a pseudo-time constraint on the players

22

Adam Stites, "NFLPA Is Warning Players to Start Saving Money Now for a 2021
Lockout," SBNation.com, https://www.sbnation.com/2017/5/30/15712404/nflpa-cba-nfllockout-2021-leverage-negotiations.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
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that the owners were not concerned with. This has, however, impacted how the current
crop of NFL players has prepared for the upcoming CBA negotiations. Veteran players
that were a part of the last round of negotiations, as well as the NFLPA, have been
warning younger players to begin saving years in advance for what could be another
difficult set of negotiations for both parties.25 Without the ability to support themselves
financially, the players would enter the negotiations at a disadvantage again, something
the NFLPA is looking to avoid.
Given the complicated nature of many of the issues tackled in a CBA, the above
background section is fairly robust in its explanations of some of the minutia involved in
past CBA negotiations. However, all of this context is crucial in understanding why the
2011 CBA is the way that it is, the incentives for each party to engage in certain
tradeoffs, and how these incentives will play into future CBA negotiations, specifically in
2021.

Section II - The Reality of the 2011 CBA:
Given the above context, it is clear that there were a lot of issues brewing below
the surface that came to a head during the 2011 CBA negotiations. Moving on from
internal squabbles in earlier negotiations, the owners united in their feeling that they were
not getting their share of profits as compared to the players. After the owners opted-out of
the 2006 CBA, it was clear that they were preparing for war, which the players did not
recognize quickly enough to financially prepare. The players, in turn, focused more on
their safety, as research continued to be released about the harmful effects of football on

25

Ibid.
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the brain and the NFL dealt with continued lawsuits from former players suffering from
the horrific physical and mental trauma of their playing years. Finally, Roger Goodell
was participating in his first CBA negotiations as NFL Commissioner, and it appears as
though he sought to begin his reign as a shrewd negotiator with a no-nonsense attitude, as
he amassed never before seen punitive powers.
The combination of these factors resulted in three major types of changes in the
2011 CBA. These addressed financial concerns, as emphasized by the owners, player
safety concerns, as emphasized by the players, and Commissioner powers, as sought by
Goodell. All of the sides came in with different intentions, leading to a CBA with a very
different flavor than its predecessors. Each of the areas of focus for the negotiating
parties resulted in unintended consequences for everyone involved, ultimately completely
altering the incentive structure for players and owners financially, as well as behaviorally.
Furthermore, for each point of emphasis for the players, owners, and NFL, there was also
a negotiating point that they were willing to lose ground on. Thus, there was a system of
tradeoffs that could result in a mutually beneficial allocation, but the issue was in finding
it. Unfortunately for the players, the system that was eventually agreed did not appear to
be in their best interest.

A) Financial Concerns:
While every aspect of the CBA is considered and painstakingly negotiated for or
against by every party, each of the groups entered the negotiations with specific goals on
how they wanted the 2011 CBA to be different from those previous. As discussed above,
the 2006 CBA negotiations caught the NFL owners at a time when infighting and revenue
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sharing between owners was a larger issue than revenue sharing between owners as a
whole and players. When the owners recognized that they could have done better, they
scrapped the deal and entered the 2011 CBA negotiations with a one-track mind. Thus,
this section will focus on the financial considerations of the owners and players and how
these impacted the resulting incentives of the 2011 CBA. This will be done through the
exploration of two key items in the CBA, namely the salary cap/floor and changes in the
rookie pay scale in conjunction with an increase to the veteran minimum salary. Both of
these issues highlight areas where the owners sought to control the earning potential of
players, and where the players were forced to consider trade-offs between monetary and
other benefits. Here, players successfully obtained financial security through salary cap
negotiations, but ultimately may have pushed veterans out of the league by cheapening
rookie contracts and making veteran minimum contracts prohibitively large.

1) The Salary Cap
The salary cap is often a contentious issue in CBA negotiations and is thus a great
place to start an analysis. Given the history of the salary cap as described above and the
rationale behind it, players have accepted its existence in the NFL landscape and the
owners rely upon it in order to control the influence that players can wield within their
teams. However, the size of the salary cap is where players and owners deviate. Previous
CBA negotiations had changed the percentage of NFL revenues that were allocated to the
salary cap, which was often used as a tradeoff by both players and owners to secure other
benefits. Specifically, as mentioned above, the owners were unhappy with how the 2006
CBA allocated the salary cap and was the primary driver behind their opt-out. Thus, the
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salary cap was clearly a priority for the owners while it had taken a backseat for the
players.
An added wrinkle in negotiations regarding the salary cap is what exactly the
salary cap is a percentage of. While for a casual observer “NFL revenues” is a sufficient
metric, but when one actually looks at the numbers that term leaves a significant amount
of wiggle room. Clear revenue streams such as multi-billion dollar TV deals provide a
significant floor, but ticket sales, merchandise sales, advertisement sales in different
markets, sales from league stores, uniform endorsements, etc. each provide a unique
challenge in their addition to the total. Furthermore, the owners often seek to exclude
portions of NFL revenues from salary cap considerations. Currently, the NFL considers
all streams of revenue when calculating the salary cap, while previously metrics such as
gross revenue have been used.26 The result of the 2006 CBA negotiations was the players
leaving with 59.6% of NFL revenues following a $1 billion credit to the NFL owners.27
After renegotiation, in which players did receive increases to their pensions and
acquisitions in player safety, the players left the 2011 CBA negotiations with between
just 47-48% of all revenue, which was estimated at about 4% less than the previous
agreement when the CBA was signed when considering the re-addition of the $1 billion
that had previously been credited to the owners.28
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To see what this numerically means, the salary cap in 2009 (2010 was uncapped)
was $123 million, while the salary cap for 2011 was $120.3 million.29 In 2012, this
increased by only $300,000 to $120.6 million, which made many players skeptical of the
new CBA with respect to players’ earnings. Since then, a new TV deal has been signed
and league revenues have continued to increase, which has in turn increased the salary
cap by about $10 million per year. 30 This is a much higher rate than anyone had
projected immediately following the CBA. Clearly Goodell validated the owners’ trust by
continuing to increase league revenues despite global economic hardship and social
pressure, while the players enjoyed increasingly large salary caps despite a decreased
percentage of the total revenue, which they had used to gain ground in other areas of
negotiation. A full breakdown of the NFL salary caps over the last 15 years is included in
Appendix A. The salary caps listed are the league standard salary caps. Salary caps utilize
a variety of roll over strategies to incentivize teams to spend freely, which causes each
team’s yearly cap to slightly differ from one another. However, given that the focus of
the analysis is on league trends, salary caps will be understood as the standard league
salary cap.
The last important bargaining issue in regards to salary caps is minimum
spending. While the fans eyes might gravitate towards the big signings and high spending
teams, players are most concerned with teams spending too little and hurting the demand
for their services. Thus, one of the benefits players received from decreasing the
percentage of league revenues allocated to the salary cap was in regards to the minimum
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spending of the salary cap.31 The minimum salary cap spending is calculated in two ways,
minimum league-wide spending, and minimum team spending.32 This addresses the two
main concerns that players had with spending by teams.
Their first concern, that having only a minimum spending requirement per team
would allow teams to create a lower salary cap in practice by depressing wages from
within, is avoided with the league-wide minimum spending requirement. For the 20112012 seasons, the league-wide minimum spending was set at 99% of the salary cap (99%
of the league’s salary cap) over those 2 years.33 For the 2013-2016 seasons and 20172020 seasons, the league wide minimum spending was set at 95% of the salary over each
of those four-year spans independently.34 This gave the owners some leeway within a
particular year to have relatively lower wages that may have been caused by an outside
factor, but still holds them accountable for keeping players gainfully employed.
Players also sought to avoid the issue of a single team with too small of a payroll,
which is solved by minimum team spending rules. For 2011-2012 there were not
minimum team spending rules given the 99% in league-wide spending.35 However,
during the two four-year spans of 2013-2016 and 2017-2020 there was a minimum team
spending requirement of 89% of their salary cap.36 This again allows teams to deviate in a
given season if they are unable to attract the talent that they are looking for or are
building with young players that are not highly paid, but still ensures that no team takes
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advantage of its monopsony power over the employment of players to artificially
depresses wages.
The salary cap was put in place by the owners to serve as a check on the increase
in leverage provided to players by free agency. In order to control the amount of bidding
that could occur on individual players, the salary cap provides owners a reason to keep
player wages relatively stable over time. Thus, while the salary cap does not benefit the
players, it provides a counter balance to free agency that allows many players to
financially prosper. Furthermore, the salary cap provides a negotiating platform for
spending minimums, which are very beneficial to players. In the case of the salary cap,
players have continued to have success in negotiations, securing a fair percentage of the
total league revenues, while also enjoying the benefits of free agency in addition to
league and team spending floors.
The salary cap also provides room for negotiation with respect to other items,
serving as an area that the NFLPA will often use as a negotiating strategy. During the
2011 negotiations, players were able to secure benefits to their long-term health with the
creation of a $1 billion fund, $620 million of which was used to create the Legacy
Fund.37 The Legacy Fund is used for the pensions and health benefits for former players,
a great tradeoff for a small percentage of the players’ share of league revenues. This was
a successful gamble by the NFLPA, since league revenues have continued to increase
over the life of the CBA, ensuring that player salaries continue to grow despite the
smaller percentage of league revenues allocated to players. Therefore, players were able
to secure the best of both worlds, with more money than ever going towards player
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salaries in addition to the existence of a well-endowed Legacy Fund, which benefits their
long-term health and financial stability. While players may have secured a victory with
respect to the salary cap, other successes in the 2011 negotiations appear to be few and
far between.

2) Rookie Pay Scale and Veteran Minimum
The Rookie Pay Scale was established in the 2011 CBA as a way to control
outsized rookie contracts. While, over the history of the league, rookies have tended to be
compensated lower than veterans, that gap began to narrow as football continued to gain
national prominence. Furthermore, with college football’s increasing popularity, players
began coming into the league with increasing levels of skill and popularity. Because of
this, rookie contracts, when unregulated, reached levels that were unsustainable. This was
especially true since, despite increased level of college competition, rookies still come
into the NFL as an unknown commodity. Franchises were continually hamstrung by
locking themselves into long, high paying contracts with rookies that did not always
produce at a high level in the NFL. However, since rookies ultimately have the ability to
not sign their contract until they are satisfied with the terms, and a team’s first round pick
is so crucial to a team’s success, the deals continued getting larger. Veteran salaries were
impacted as well because of the zero-sum nature of the salary cap. When rookies signed
long-term outsized contracts, this left less money for veterans around the league, and left
fewer teams with the flexibility to pursue them. These issues are permanently linked
because of the finite resources of the salary cap, which is why players bargained for these
issues with the other in mind.
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In 2009, the Detroit Lions spent $90 million on rookie contracts out of a salary
cap of $123 million according to Forbes.38 This number might seem startlingly high, but
after drafting in the top 5 for multiple years, players continue to seek higher paying
contracts with no real limits on their negotiating ability. Upon the implementation of the
rookie pay scale in 2011, Detroit’s spending on rookies decreased by two-thirds.39 Under
the new system, rookies receive slotted contracts based on where they are drafted.
Rookie contracts are locked in for three years, meaning that regardless of the
circumstance they cannot renegotiate until after their third year for first round picks.40
First round contracts are a total of four years, with a fifth year team option that they can
choose to exercise, other drafted players have a four year contract, and undrafted players
can sign a three year contract.41 These contracts are all predetermined based on a formula
agreed to by the NFL and NFLPA, which is not public knowledge.42 The first year salary
is determined by this formula, and it is up to the teams and the players to negotiate the
terms of the following years within the restrictions supplied by the NFL, the most
important being that a rookie’s salary cannot increase by more than 25% per year. This
formula was created in order to control the total amount of the league wide salary cap that
is allocated to rookie contracts.43 Veterans fought for this condition because they felt as
though it was unfair to have rookies making some of the highest salaries in the league,
with no controls on their total amount of guaranteed money while veterans were often
38
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playing under contracts with much smaller guarantees that were usually shorter term.44
Rookies drafted outside of the first round also have slotted salaries, with players drafted
in the third through seventh round slotted between $400,000 and $500,000 and second
round picks coming in between $1 million and $500,000, depending on where in each
round they were drafted.45
Veterans were able to make this trade-off in exchange for an increase in their own
minimum salary. First, veterans secured their right to unrestricted free agency after four
accrued seasons in the NFL, which was also the case during the 2006 CBA but was
increased to six credited seasons during the uncapped year.46 Credited seasons are
essentially the number of seasons active in the NFL and are not different enough to merit
explanation. Appendix C contains the veteran minimum salaries for each year of the 2011
CBA. Increasing the veteran minimum was a major priority for the NFLPA as they were
negotiating, given the increased publicity and studies that have been done on the
prevalence of CTE and other health issues with football players after their retirement, as
well as while they are playing. There was specifically a priority placed on the
compensation of older veterans, which is reflected in the values displayed in the
minimum salary table. Some specific numbers worthy of note; in 2011, these minimums
were $685,000 for players with 4-6 credited seasons, $810,000 for players with 7-9
credited seasons, and $910,000 for players with 10+ credited seasons.47 This was largely
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viewed as a tradeoff specifically between veterans and rookies, however it introduced
issues that might not have been fully considered during bargaining.
The implementation of higher veteran minimums at the cost of the creation of a
rookie pay scale brings to the forefront the issue of bargaining for future generations.
Similar to the current attitude of older generations toward global warming, NFL players
that had already experienced, and benefitted from, the lack of a rookie pay scale when
they were on their rookie deals then implemented this slotted system on future
generations. Since its implementation, players on their rookie deals have been speaking
publicly about the many issues with the rookie pay scale, with many primarily focused on
the issue of renegotiation being limited to after a player’s third credited season. At the
time of the negotiations, veterans were disgruntled with the increasing size of rookie
contracts and correspondingly decreasing size of their own contracts. These policies were
meant to solve that issue, however some studies indicate that it may have instead created
a new issue of larger veteran contracts, but for fewer players. Intuitively this might not
immediately make sense, given that veterans were now mandated to make higher wages
and rookies to make lower wages. However, what veterans failed to factor in was the
impact of substitution.
Rookies are very good substitutes for NFL veterans, and are typically younger
and healthier making them preferable in some ways.48 The implementation of these two
policies were meant to secure a larger piece of the salary cap for veterans, but may
actually have resulted in many veterans being pushed out of the league because of
prohibitively high salaries with respect to rookies. Forcing veteran contracts higher did
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not actually benefit veterans that were already highly paid, and may have served to
exclude veterans on the margins of rosters. Rookies, who could often fill these periphery
roster spots at a similar level to veterans, make less than half of the veteran minimum for
players in the 4-6 credited season range, and even less than players with more credited
seasons.
Rookies likely became a much more attractive alternative to general managers
who were receiving essentially the same good for half the price, in addition to younger
players having a decreased injury risk since they often have shorter injury histories.
Teams could then spend more on their star players as they filled the rest of their roster out
with young players that are often not on the team beyond their rookie contracts. Knowing
this also would allow teams to utilize players on their first contracts in more dangerous
plays such as on special teams and trick plays. These compromises were intended to not
only increase veteran pay, but also to increase player safety by removing resources from
the rookies and allocating more resources to pensions and insurance policies of veterans
and former players. While the players were successful in increasing their pensions, the
overall result of the policy was ambiguous at best. When one considers the incentives of
the policy, it is evident that owners could take advantage of low rookie contracts and
push veterans out of the game with little to no impact on the performance of the team.
As of yet, there is limited evidence and research regarding whether the 2011 CBA
actually pushed veterans out of the league in favor of rookies. The little research that may
resolve this issue comes from a study done by the Wall Street journal, and a related
follow-up study by Pro Football Outsiders, a reputable and well respected football
analysis website.
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The first iteration to consider is by The Wall Street Journal. The analysts at the
Wall Street Journal looked at the Football Encyclopedia of Players found on Pro Football
Reference with respect to the first and last year of each player’s career. They used this as
the length of career for players and compared the average career length of players over
time. The Wall Street Journal found a decrease in the average length of players’ careers
from 2008-2015 from 4.99 years to 2.66 years.49
Zach Binney, a writer for Football Outsiders, attempted to replicate this test, and
was unable to achieve the same result. He pointed to a change in how Pro Football
Reference tracked players, increasing the number of players that were able to be found in
their index, which was tied to an increase in the number of players in the index that did
not play any regular season snaps and thus had short careers.50 In order to correct for this
error, Binney conducted the same study, but instead of using all of the players included in
the Encyclopedia, he considered only those players that had played in at least one regular
season game.51 By doing so, Binney used a more common standard of what it means to
be an NFL player, and thus produced results that were more consistent with the football
community’s perception. While Binney corrected for the flaws in the Wall Street
Journal’s methodology, he may not have fully considered the outcomes of his study.
In Binney’s iteration of the study, he found a career length of between 5.8 and 6.2
years from 2007 to 2011, with that number dropping to 5.6 and 5.4 in 2012 and 2013
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respectively.52 Unfortunately this study was done just before the 2015 season, limiting its
ability to aptly consider the impact of the 2011 CBA due to the limited amount of
information during the current CBA. The career length of players before 2007 ranges
from 5.1 to 5.5 from 2001 to 2006, so the 5.6 and 5.4 numbers may not necessarily be the
beginning of a downwards trend.
What Binney failed to consider, however, is that 2007-2011 constitutes the life of
the 2006 CBA, which was widely acknowledged as better for the players. It is not
inconsequential that the years before the 2006 CBA and after demonstrated a career
length that was demonstrably different, if not very drastic. While it is impossible to
conclude that player careers are decreasing since the implementation of the 2011 CBA
with just the 2012 and 2013 results, it does still demonstrate that player’s careers are
impacted by CBAs. It is also worth noting that most rookie contracts in the 2006 CBA
were six year contracts, while the current contracts are four years with a fifth year option.
It may be a coincidence that these are about the average length of careers for players
during the time of those CBAs, but is worth recognizing nonetheless.
These studies sought to determine if playing careers were shortening, and offered
a few different potential explanations such as increasing injury awareness, an increasing
number of players utilized by teams overall, or the new CBA.53 While these are all
possible explanations for the shortening career of players, the injury issue seems as
though it would incentivize a few players to retire early, but likely not influence teams or
the majority of players that are seeking to maximize their earnings potential with little
consideration for their long-term health. Furthermore, the increasing number of regular
52
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season players that Binney found, 1,895 in 2007 to 1,962 in 2015, supports the idea that
there were more rookies in the league as they are more often dropped and added
throughout the season due to the very small guaranteed financial commitment teams have
the ability to make to rookies.54 Thus, the most likely explanation for the decreasing
career length of players is the creation of the rookie pay scale. This is especially
convincing since the observable trend begins right at the inception of the agreement.
However, the other factors are still worthy of consideration and highlight the complex
nature of the issue.
This discussion of veteran minimums, rookie pay scales, and the salary cap/floor
highlights the main financial takeaways from the 2011 CBA. Players clearly sought to
guard their future paychecks and protect themselves from the owners. They utilized the
salary cap floors on both a team and league wide basis to prevent teams from
intentionally underpaying players and prevent collusion by the owners. The players
leveraged their relative success in the previous negotiation to take a smaller overall
percentage of league revenues in exchange for higher team and league minimum
spending requirements. Just as the salary cap provides a protection for owners against
quickly inflating player wages, the salary floor provides protection for the players against
the monopsony power of the owners.
The players then turned their focus to the minimum spend on veterans, which
many felt was too low in relation to their rookie counterparts. However, given that only
players in the league are represented at the negotiations, there were no defenders of the
rookie contract. Thus, players were able to secure increased minimum salaries for
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veterans at the cost of rookie salaries, which seemed to be a success. However, the
players failed to anticipate how decreasing the cost of younger players could actually hurt
the prospects of veterans. Given the increased veteran minimum and decreased rookie
salaries, teams have become financially incentivized to fill roster spots with younger
players, having the opposite effect from the players’ intentions. Perhaps including a
representative for rookies in the 2021 CBA negotiation could help mitigate some of the
issues that arise from the lack of perspective from rookies.

B) Player Safety Concerns
As medical research into the effects of football on the brain and body improve,
current and former players continue to gain insight into how the game could be affecting
them. While former players no longer have the ability to protect themselves from this
harm, leading to lawsuits against the NFL with massive payouts, current players are able
to better protect themselves by continuing to push for rule changes that make the game
safer. This is best done through the CBA process, and player took full advantage of this
in the 2011 negotiations. As mentioned above, players took a sizeable decrease in the
percentage of league revenue that they had access to, partially for financial benefits, but
some of the key substantive changes from the 2011 CBA were in player safety, both
monetarily and in league-wide rule changes.
Player safety has not always been the NFL’s priority, and many would argue that
it still isn’t today, but in the years the 2011 CBA the NFL has made almost yearly rule
changes in an attempt to decrease the violence of the game. While some believe that
violence is inherent in football, it is clear that changes can be made to incentivize teams
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and players to protect the participants of the sport and reduce injuries. Since 2011, rule
changes such as moving the placement of the ball to the 25-yard line, rather than the 20,
in the case of a touchback, increasing the emphasis on hits on defenseless players,
personal fouls, and other especially violent hits by referees, and reducing overtime length
have changed the incentives of some especially dangerous plays. By placing the ball on
the 25-yard line rather than the 20 in the event of a touchback, the league provided an
incentive for teams to return kicks less often, which is in one of the most dangerous plays
in the sport.
Given that only nine NFL teams averaged over 25 yards per kickoff the year
before the rule was implemented, this is a fairly strong incentive for teams not to return
most kicks.55 After considering that most kickoffs are caught inside the end zone,
necessitating the returner gain 25 yards plus however deep he was in the end zone in
order to reach the 25-yard line, it becomes even less reasonable for teams to attempt to
return a kick in anything other than perfect circumstances. Furthermore, conservative
coaches can point to the scoring likelihood difference and choose to play the numbers,
where in the season before the implementation of the rule, touchdowns were scored on
20.8% of drives starting on the 25-yard line as compared to 17.9% of the drives starting
on the 20-yard line.56 This serves the purpose of both making the game more exciting to
fans looking to watch high-power offenses, and safer for the players. However, changes

55

Adam Stites, "NFL Bumps Touchbacks to 25-yard Line for 2016," SBNation.com,
https://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2016/3/22/11269056/nfl-touchbacks-rule-change-fails-2520-yard-line.
56
Judy Battista, "New Touchback Rule: Another Step Toward Eliminating Kickoffs?,"
NFL.com History, http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000648647/article/newtouchback-rule-another-step-toward-eliminating-kickoffs.

33
like this do also fundamentally change the game and devalue a set of players, which some
coaches and players have resisted. Clearly there is still more work to be done by the NFL,
but these rule changes make it easier for supporters of the league to point to positive
progress. The above rule changes were spurred by conversations around player safety that
occurred during the 2011 negotiations, and are a great way to put these changes in
context.
One focus in the negotiations was in making preseason activities safer for players
as they began to ease back into playing shape. In previous iterations of the CBA, players
were often subjected to training camps meant to quickly transition them from non-playing
shape into playing shape. However, players often complained of an uptick in injuries as a
result of this rapid shift from a relaxed lifestyle to an immediate highly active lifestyle.
These practices had very little limits on their length, the number per day, or the amount of
contact allowed. In the 2011 CBA, players hoped that by further regulating these
preseason practices, it would help to limit the number of injuries that occur before the
season. Therefore, the 2011 CBA implemented a system where, as reported by the New
York Daily News, the “first day of training camp limited to physicals and meetings;
second and third day no pads or contact; only one padded practice per day, limited to
three hours; second practice can only be a walkthrough”.57 This, players hoped, would
allow them to ease into training by limiting their activity in the first few days of camp,
and having only one practice per day.
Another attempt to make the game safer was through the creation of a rule
limiting the number of padded practices allowed by the NFL. The CBA states that,
57
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“during the regular season, padded practices for all players shall be limited to a total of
fourteen, eleven of which must be held during the first eleven weeks of the regular
season, and three of which must be held during the remaining six weeks of the regular
season”.58 This attempted to solve a similar issue to the limits placed on preseason
practices, since players often found themselves entering games while exhausted from the
week of practice. By limiting the contact in practice, players were able to limit the toll
that repeated activity has on their body, in addition to reducing the number of hits that
they take, especially in the head. Limiting the physical reps of players has also had the
effect of emphasizing the cerebral nature of the game, pushing more practice time
towards watching game film to identify the weaknesses of opponents and on play design.
The goal of this policy was certainly noble, but many coaches argue that some of the
declining technique observed in current players in positions such as along the offensive
line can be attributed to this reduction in “real-time” reps for young players. This decline
in play, along with the reported injury numbers since the 2011 CBA, have led many to
question the efficacy of these rule change for their intended purpose.
A recently published study by Zachary Binney and other researchers at the Emory
University Schools of Public Health and School of Medicine, goes in depth on the
number of injuries suffered by players since the CBA and whether those were
conditioning or non-conditioning injuries.59 This helps to contextualize how the above
player safety changes may have impacted players’ conditioning, and thus potentially
caused more injuries than it prevented.
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Binney et al examined how conditioning related injuries changed over time,
where they defined conditioning injuries to be those identified by “an orthopedics and
sports medicine physician with extensive experience as an NFL team physician”
according to the study.60 By reducing practice and conditioning time in preseason and the
regular season, players may have put themselves at increased risk for conditioning
injuries. Binney and his colleagues observed conditioning-related injuries increasing
between 2007 and 2011 from 197 to 271.61 This is an incredibly large jump, but can be at
least partially attributed to the 2011 offseason being shortened by the bargaining process.
Since players were unsure if they would be playing that season, and since training camp
was cut short because of bargaining, players did not have as much time to physically
prepare as they may have wanted. Thus, the 2011 season was likely an aberration, but
trends from the rest of the CBA can be observed.
For the rest of the CBA, the researchers observed a rate of 220-240 conditioningrelated injuries since (in years 2012-2017), which is significantly higher than the 2007
level but also significantly lower than the 2011 level. Binney utilized a Poisson model to
estimate how conditioning-related injury occurrences may have been impacted by the
CBA, and ultimately found that the CBA caused an immediate 5% increase in
conditioning-related injuries in the post-2011 CBA NFL.62 They also observed that in the
pre-2011 CBA NFL, conditioning related injuries were increasing, while in the post-2011
CBA NFL the rate was consistent.63

60

Ibid, page 5.
Ibid, page 1.
62
Ibid, page 7.
63
Ibid, page 7.
61

36
After looking more into the data of the study, the idea that the rate of the
occurrence of conditioning-related injuries was increasing before 2011 seems to rely on
an increase in 2010, which I would contend should be removed from consideration for
similar reasons to 2011. While the preseason in 2010 did not suffer the same shrinking as
in 2011, the differences in free agency based on accrued season and the fact that there
was no salary cap caused confusion for many players. By removing 2010 and 2011 from
consideration, the trend is much clearer, with slight increases before 2010 but a
significant jump following the implementation of the 2011 CBA. This indicates that,
while the CBA may have been intended to keep players safer, it might have actually put
players in harms way by effectively underpreparing them for the season.
The intentions of the 2011 CBA were, in earnest, to make the game safer. Owners
could lose their revenue streams, coaches could lose their jobs, and players could lose
their lives if football is not made safer and more sustainable. However, as is often the
case, the intended results of the policies in the 2011 CBA and the actual results are
significantly different. While players may have sought to protect themselves by limiting
the number of hits they were taking in practice, it may have actually increased their
likelihood of injuries in games. Similarly, while players may have sought to ease into the
preseason more effectively, they may have put themselves at an increased risk of
conditioning-related injuries but limiting the amount of time that they spent getting into
football shape. Coaches often point to the 2011 CBA as limiting their time with players
and thus their ability to improve them via coaching, but the biggest issue with the more
limited practice rules might actually be the injuries caused by the resulting underpreparation of players.
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C) Commissioner Powers
Given that that the NFLPA was fighting so hard for benefits in other areas, it
appears as though the negotiators did not fully consider the impact of the augmented
powers provided to Roger Goodell. This has ultimately been the largest, and most
consistent, point of contention between the league and the players and is the reason that
the upcoming negotiations are shaping up to be as intense, if not more, than those that
occurred in 2011. Many players supported increasing accountability when the first
personal conduct policy was implemented, but as Goodell began to wield his powers to
their fullest extent, opinions quickly changed.
In reflecting on the important take-aways from the CBA, very few articles form
2011 mention Goodell’s increased discretion with respect to discipline, which is an
interesting window into how priorities can change. Since then, the NFL has come under
increased scrutiny for actions taken by players such as Ray Rice, Adrian Peterson, and
Ezekiel Elliot, all of whom were accused of domestic violence, among other players
accused of others. Many believe that Roger Goodell has acted as judge, jury, and
executioner in these situations to the increasing consternation of the players, which has
created a very combative relationship between them and the Commissioner. Due to the
fact that, as mentioned above, NFL discipline does not require a ruling by the justice
system, many players felt as though the rulings passed down by Goodell were overly
harsh, unsubstantiated, or both. While the public tended to land on the opposite side of
most issues, which put Goodell in a difficult position, players have become increasingly
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fed-up with what they see as Goodell acting out of spite and having an undue impact on
the outcome of games and teams’ successes.64
In 2014, the NFL was embroiled in a public relations crisis due to Peterson and
Rice, both of whom were accused of domestic violence with just a few months. A video
emerged in February 2014 of Rice striking his then fiancée, which led to criminal charges
and a conviction, but after agreeing to undergo court-supervised and marrying his
girlfriend in March, the charges were dropped.65 Rice was suspended for only the first
two games of the season for the incident, which caused a public outcry. However, once
additional footage was released in September of Rice punching his fiancée in the face
during the incident, Rice was cut by the Ravens and suspended indefinitely by the league,
which he eventually appealed and got overturned. However, the negative press associated
with Rice and his declining skillset ultimately ended his career following this incident.
In a similar situation to Rice, Adrian Peterson was accused of abusing his child in
early September of 2014, as pictures surfaced of his son’s legs with injuries from being
hit with a stick.66 He pleaded no contest in court and was sentenced to community service
by the justice system, but the NFL waited until November to rule, when they suspended
Peterson for the remainder of the season without pay. Since then, Peterson has continued
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in the league as the issue has generally left the public’s consciousness and he has
continued to play at a high level. Before his suspension, Peterson was placed on the
Commissioner’s Exempt list, which prevented Peterson from playing but did not
correspond with any sort of verdict issued by the league or the justice system.
Both of these incidents highlight the increased accountability that resulted from
Goodell’s power, but where players began to diverge was through the use of tools such as
the Commissioners Exempt list. Players worried that, if the Commissioner had the power
to remove players from games before there has been a complete investigation, disgruntled
ex-partners or family members may seek to take advantage of this. Furthermore, many
players were upset with the fact that the consequences for Rice and Peterson were
comparable to a first offense for smoking marijuana, and were much less severe than
punishments experienced by a player such as Martavis Bryant for violating the marijuana
policy multiple times. Bryant was first suspended 4 games for violating the leagues
policy on marijuana (2 games more than Rice’s initial suspension), and following his
second offense he was suspended for a full season. These punishments were based on an
agreed upon system of consequences, however the relative punishments caused
consternation among players, especially considering that a third violation of the
marijuana policy results in an indefinite suspension.
Goodell made his biggest mistake when he sought to discipline Tom Brady and
the New England Patriots for what was thought to be tampering with the game balls used
in the AFC Divisional and Championship playoff rounds. When officials tested the air
pressure in the balls at halftime, some were outside of the acceptable inflation range. This
was enough to convince the league that the Patriots had intentionally deflated the balls in
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order to gain a competitive advantage. Goodell then suspended Brady for 4 games, fined
the team 1 million dollars, and took two draft picks from the team. Brady, the Patriots,
and the Players Union fought this ruling by pointing to The Ideal Gas Law, which
indicates that the level of deflation observed by game officials was natural given the
conditions of the game. Despite the fact that this is scientifically proven and
corroborated, Goodell continued his pursuit of Brady, which led to back and forth battles
in court and multiple rounds of appeals over the course of the entire 2015 season.
Ultimately, Brady served his 4 game suspension a full year later than it was originally
intended, which he turned into a Super Bowl winning season. The lack of oversight on
Goodell enraged players and the NFLPA alike, causing many to swear that Goodell
would not maintain his power into the next CBA.
By prioritizing player safety and earnings, the NFLPA did not fully consider how
Goodell’s discretion over league discipline might impact the players on a personal level.
They also failed to recognize how Goodell’s discretion might impact their ability to make
political statements, like the National Anthem Protests that gripped the nation last season.
While the policy introduced at the beginning of the league year banning kneeling on the
field during the anthem has since been rescinded, it a constant reminder of the growing
divide between the players and the league. This might incentivize players to fight more
for the ability to have a say in the disciplinary process, which would deeply complicate
the upcoming negotiations. Players will likely need to trade some of the gains that they
have made in other areas in order to decrease Goodell’s discretion, which will almost
certainly cause debate among the players over how to prioritize other issues. Regardless
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of how the upcoming negotiations shake out, players must remain united in order to
address their concern with Goodell’s powers and bargain for their best outcome.

Section III - Conclusion:
Clearly CBA negotiations are incredibly complex and often have unanticipated
results. From players being pushed out of the league because of prohibitively high selfimposed salaries to players being at a higher risk of injury due to decreasing practice
time, the policies sought by many players in this round of negotiations may have been
more harmful than beneficial. As my argument presented, the 2011 CBA as a whole may
not have put in place the best policies for the players. While team owners and the league
likely did not fully anticipate the outcomes of these policies either, players were the ones
that were most hurt by these failures.
Financially, players prioritized the salary floor and veteran minimums, which
resulted in a mixed bag of successes and distinct failures. Additionally, players sought to
make the game safer, securing funds for retired players and their families, increasing
benefits, and reducing practice time in an attempt to limit the physical toll on their
bodies. However, this may have actually caused them to be underprepared for the season,
potentially increasing conditioning related injuries. Finally, the NFLPA allowed the
league to implement new personal conduct standards under the supervision of League
Commissioner Roger Goodell, which has proven to be wildly unpopular with players.
This failure to anticipate the real effects of policy has caused many players to unite and
seek an agreement with a completely different set of incentives.
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For the upcoming 2021 CBA negotiation, there has already been quite a bit of
discussion around the relevant issues. Current president of the NFLPA, DeMaurice
Smith, has specifically mentioned addressing commissioner powers, injury occurrence on
Thursday Night Football, and increased benefits for former players, among others.67
Little is likely to be done to address the incentive issue caused by the rookie pay scale
and high veteran minimums, as there is still no medium for the advocating for future
rookies, and the veterans taking part in the negotiations are still a part of the league. The
salary cap/floor is always an issue that is renegotiated in each CBA, but will likely
remain in a similar position. Injuries are always on the mind of players and, with
increasing pressure of the NFL to protect its players, there will likely be a combined
effort between the players and the league to augment the current system to address
injuries. The league has already taken some steps to address this with the addition of
doctors not affiliated with a team performing the concussion evaluations for players in
games. Based on conversations around the league, players will be putting a high priority
on decreasing the amount of power wielded by Commissioner Goodell with respect to
player discipline. As the negotiation date draws closer, players are preparing for a lockout
the likes of which has not been seen by the NFL in decades, and could shape the future of
the league, if the players successfully anticipate the true results of their actions.
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Appendix
A
Year

Salary Cap (numbers in millions)

2018

$177.2

2017

$167

2016

$155.3

2015

$143.3

2014

$133

2013

$123

2012

$120.6

2011

$120.3

2010

Uncapped

2009

$123

2008

$116

2007

$109

2006 (start of the 2006 CBA)

$102

2005

$85.5

2004

$80.6

Adapted from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salary_cap#cite_note-nfl.com-19
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Appendix B

"NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement," page 146.

